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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Claimant Sohar Chavez was injured on September 8, 2012, when his left pinky finger got
caught in a motorized chain on some wheel lines he was moving. Local EMT personnel
responded with an ambulance, and Claimant was life-flighted from the scene of the accident,just
outside Payette, Idaho, to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise, Idaho. At St.
Alphonsus, the amputation was completed. Claimant recovered from the injury and the treatment
he received uneventfully.
Claimant filed a Complaint on October 10, 2012. Defendant Employer, Kevin Stokes,
initially responded through counsel with the filing of an Answer on November 5, 2012, denying
that Claimant was an employee. An Amended Answer with new counsel was filed by Defendant
Employer on December 17, 2012, admitting that Claimant was an employee. Defendant
Employer Stokes paid for all of Claimant's temporary disability and paid for his impairment. He
also paid for all the medical expenses Claimant incurred with the exception of the Life Flight
Network bill, which was $21,201.00.
On September 3, 2014, the Industrial Commission issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss.
On September 6, 2014, Claimant's counsel filed a Request for Calendaring on the only issue that
remained, which was the reasonableness of the Life Flight Network service under Idaho Code §
72-432. The matter was calendared to be heard on October 30, 2013, at which time a hearing was
conducted by Referee Michael E. Powers. Exhibits were offered and admitted at hearing, and
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testimony was taken from Defendant Employer Kevin Stokes. At the conclusion of the hearing,
both parties and the Referee decided that briefing was not necessary.
Referee Powers submitted his Findings

of Fact, Conclusions

of Law and

Recommendation on March 10, 2014. The Referee concluded in his proposed decision that he
was "unable to find in the record as submitted any evidence that it was reasonable or necessary
to life-flight Claimant from near Fruitland to Boise based upon an apparent misconception that
Claimant's small fingertip could be salvaged." He went on to note that "there is no evidence that
such could not have been accomplished at Holy Rosary or that arrangements could not have been
made to transfer him to St. Alphonsus." (Agency Record, p. 13).
The Industrial Commission chose to not adopt the Referee's proposed decision, and by
letter dated April 7, 2014, requested briefing on whether a finding that the Life Flight Network
care was not reasonable would leave Claimant exposed to a civil action for collection of the bill.
(Agency Record, p. 15). The parties then submitted briefing, and the Industrial Commission
issued its decision on September 26, 2014. In that decision the Industrial Commission concluded
that treatment in the form of life-flighting Claimant from outside Payette to St. Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center in Boise was reasonable under Idaho Code § 72-432 and under the
decision of Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 722, 779 P.2d 395, 397
(1989). Defendant Employer timely filed an appeal of the Industrial Commission decision.
A.

FACTS OF CASE:
Defendant Employer Kevin Stokes is a farmer in Fruitland. (HT, p. 17, 11. 8-22). He hired

Sohar Chavez, the claimant in this case, to help him with irrigation in April of 2012. (HT, p. 18,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

2

11. 6-14). On the day of the accident Defendant Employer Stokes got a phone call from Payette
County Dispatch advising him that Claimant had been injured and where he was. (HT, p. 19, 11.
21-24). He went to the scene of the accident, at which time he found three Payette County
paramedics, a Sheriffs deputy, and Defendant's uncle. Claimant was there as well. (HT, p. 20, 11.
1 - 6). Claimant had obviously received first aid evidenced by the fact he was holding his hand
up in the air elevated and it was bandaged. (HT, p. 20, 11. 9-12). Defendant Stokes immediately
inquired as to what was going to happen next, and did not get an answer from any of the
personnel there. (HT, p. 20, 11. 15-19). He initiated the inquiry, because the ambulance was there
and he couldn't figure out why they weren't taking Claimant to the hospital. (HT, p. 20, 1. 22 - p.
21, 1). That was when he found out that a helicopter was going to show up, and he asked them
why that was necessary. (HT, p.21, 11. 1 - 15). Defendant Stokes did not believe that bringing
Life Flight Network into the equation was reasonable and expressed these concerns to the
personnel on the scene. They did not respond to his inquiries in this regard. (HT, p. 21, 11. 8-20).
After the incident, Defendant Stokes drove the distance between the accident scene and
Holy Rosary Hospital in Ontario, Oregon, 3 times at different times of the day. It took 15
minutes at the longest, and 12 minutes at the shortest. (HT, p. 22, 11. 4 - 8). The distance between
the accident scene and the ER door of Holy Rosary in Ontario turned out to be 9.8 miles. (HT, p.
22, 11. 20-21 ). After Defendant Stokes showed up, it was at least 10 minutes until the helicopter
showed up. (HT, p. 22, 1. 25 - p. 23, 1. 1). Defendant Stokes has lived in the Fruitland area most
of his life. He is aware that there are several orthopedic surgeons in the vicinity. (HT, p. 24, 11. 17).
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Later on in the evening Defendant Stokes received a phone call from Claimant at St.
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise. Defendant Stokes drove over to Boise, picked
Claimant up, and took him home. During the drive home, Claimant asked him why he was flown
to Boise -- that is to say, he did not know why he was flown to Boise. (HT, p. 27, 11. 5-10).
Exhibits include the Form 1, which documents that the accident occurred on September
8, 2012, at 5:00 p.m. The Form 1 establishes that Claimant was moving irrigation lines when his
left hand got caught up in the chain of a motor. (Defendant's Ex. 1). Payette Paramedic records
establish that they responded to the incident on September 8, 2012, and that when they arrived, a
language barrier prohibited them from learning how the injury had occurred or other "subjective
information." These records document that some off-duty Payette County paramedic EMT
telephoned in to "Medic 20." (Defendant's Ex. 2). As pointed out in the Commission's decision,
we do not know who or what "Medic 20" is. (Agency Record, p. 48, footnote 3). The paramedic
records document that some unidentified person requested Life Flight Network service
(Defendant's Ex. 2). These records do not document what, if any, conversation they had with
Claimant as to what his desires were for treatment. Keep in mind, Defendant Stokes was there
for at least 10 minutes before the helicopter arrived and could have aided in the conversation
with Claimant as to what his desires were had anyone made the attempt.
Life Flight Network records document that a request came in from Payette County EMTs
for a 41-year-old man who sustained an amputation of his pinky finger. (Defendant's Ex. 3).
These records do not establish any sort of a protocol for some sort of a triage review, which
clearly should have occurred in order to determine whether using an asset that valuable and
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expensive was appropriate. The records do not establish any sort of critical situation or
emergency that sought to be addressed by transporting Claimant to the hospital in this fashion at
this point in time.
Records from St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center start with a September 8, 2012,
Emergency Department report authored by Dr. Elliott, who quickly concluded that the pinky
finger was likely nonviable. He brought in Dr. Clawson to consult on definitive treatment. Dr.
Clawson authored an Emergency Department Consultation the same date, September 8, 2012,
noting an incomplete amputation of the left small finger at two levels. He reviewed x-rays and
concluded that the finger was not salvageable. He then proceeded to complete the amputation
and repair the stump. (Defendant's Ex. 4).
Dr. Clawson saw Claimant in followup on December 27, 2012, and observed that the
stump was well healed. He concluded that Claimant was medically stable and had suffered a
95% small finger impairment, which he noted corresponded to a 10% hand impairment, or 9%
upper extremity impairment. He did not recommend any restrictions or followup care for
Claimant. (Defendant's Ex. 5).
Defendant had the matter reviewed by Dr. Paul Collins, an orthopedic surgeon, who
concluded that the injury sustained by Claimant was "not in any way, shape or form life critical."
He pointed out that Claimant should have been taken to Holy Rosary in Ontario and worked up,
and that if it turned out for some reason he needed to be taken to Boise for vascular
reconstruction, there still would have been plenty of time to get that done. (Defendant's Ex. 6).
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II.
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether life-flighting Claimant from the scene of the accident outside of Payette to St.
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise, Idaho for partial amputation of a pinky finger was
reasonable and necessary given that Holy Rosary Hospital in Ontario, Oregon was less than 10
miles away.

III.
ARGUMENT
A.

There is No Evidence in the Medical Record which Supports the Notion that
Transporting Claimant to St Alphonsus in Boise was reasonable
Idaho Code § 72-432 defines the parameters of an employer's responsibility for medical

treatment of an injured worker. Subsection (1) of the statute requires the employer to provide,
"reasonable medical" ... "as may be reasonably required by the employee's physician," or,
"needed immediately after an injury" ... "and for a reasonable time thereafter." Idaho Code §
72-432(1 )(emphasis added). In this matter, there exists no dispute as to the facts in the record.
Claimant sustained crush injuries to his pinky finger. Emergency medical personnel responded.
They provided first aid at the scene of the accident. What is not clear from the record is how the
decision was made, by whom the decision was made, or why the decision was made to transport
Claimant from the Payette area to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise. As the
Industrial Commission's ultimate decision establishes, "The record does not clarify if the
responders to Claimant's injuries were paramedics or EMTs." (Agency Record, p. 47). The only
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portion of the record that sheds any light on this series of events states, "Off-duty Payette County
paramedics EMT landlines Medic 20 and advises finger may be able to be surgically fixed. Life
Flight Network is requested to launch." (Defendant's Ex. 2). The fact is, there is no evidence that
anyone in Payette "ordered" Claimant to be life-flighted. The record reflects that a "request" was
made.
The fact of the matter is that from this record one cannot glean exactly what happened.
All one can determine is that there was some conversation apparently initiated by an off duty
Payette County paramedic. It is clear that a call was put in to Life Flight Network. It is not clear
whether this was an order for medical care or that they were in a position to order Life Flight
Network to do anything. In the record it was characterized as an action that was "requested."
While Defendant Employer was never able to discover exactly how Life Flight Network
goes about determining whether they will respond, Defendant Employer did attempt to research
the issue to some extent. Defendant Employer put into evidence a Position Statement put out by
American College of Emergency Physicians and National Association of EMS Physicians,
entitled "Guidelines for Air Medical Dispatch Policy Resource and Education Paper." The policy
paper establishes that in general it is a good idea for Life Flight Network services to establish
guidelines to determine when they will respond. The paper goes on to outline a number of
questions that the Life Flight Network service should pose and answer before agreeing to
respond. Finally, it suggests specific situations are more likely to be appropriate for transport
than others. As to orthopedic injuries to the extremities, it suggests that finger and thumb
amputations are only appropriate for helicopter transport when replantation consideration is
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contemplated and rapid surface transport is not available. (Ex. 10, p. 12). There is nothing in the
record as to what Life Flight Network protocol was or whether that protocol was followed. We
do know that rapid surface transport was available, because an ambulance was present.
In the current instance, Claimant was less than ten (10) miles from Holy Rosary Hospital.
Driving the speed limit, it would have taken between 12 and 16 minutes to get Claimant from the
spot at which the helicopter picked him up to Holy Rosary Hospital. Holy Rosary Hospital,
obviously has an emergency room with medical physicians and all sorts of imaging devices at
their disposal to examine injuries and make recommendations for medical care. In this particular
case, there is absolutely no explanation in the record as to why Claimant could not have been
taken to Holy Rosary and had a medical workup conducted at that facility to determine what
medical care might be most appropriate, including reattachment. If reattachment were an option,
the determination as to whether local orthopedic surgeons were up to such a task or whether if
that decision turned out to be an attempt at reattachment, further determination made there at
Holy Rosary as to whether local orthopedic surgeons were up to such a task, or whether
Claimant needed to be life-flighted to Boise in order to explore the same, could have been made
at Holy Rosary. This was the obvious and the logical course of action to take. Common sense
tells you as much.
This is not, however, the analysis that the Industrial Commission decided to employ in
this case. The Industrial Commission instead cites the case of Sprague v. Caldwell
Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 722, 779 P.2d 395, 397 (1989), in an overly rigid fashion to
avoid the common sense review of the facts that it should undertake. The Commission cites to
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the test attributed to Sprague. The test is whether (a) the claimant made gradual improvement
from the treatment received; (b) the treatment was required by the claimant's physician; and (c)
the treatment received was within the physician's standard of practice, the charges for which
were fair, reasonable and similar to charges in the same profession. Hipwell v. Challenger Pallet
and Supply, 124 Idaho 294, 299, 859 P.2d 330, 335 (1993). Hipwell has been read by the
Commission as reducing the matter to an examination as to whether the treatment was required
by the claimant's physician. That is not the standard set out in the statute, and it is not the
standard industry uses. The treating physician does not get to announce what treatment is
required only to never be subject to review by anybody. The Court in Sprague quoted Idaho
Code§ 72-432(1) as follows:
The employer shall provide for an injured employee such reasonable medical,
surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service,
medicines, crutches and apparatus, as may be required by the employee's
physician, immediately after an injury or disability from an occupational
disease, and for a reasonable time thereafter. If an employer fails to provide the
same, the injured employee may do so at the expense of the employer. Sprague
v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 722, 779 P.2d 395, 397
( 1989)(emphasis added).
That is not what the statute says. In pertinent part, the statute reads:
As may be reasonably required by the employee's physician. Idaho Code §72432(1).
The difference is obvious. Through the erroneous version utilized by the Court in Sprague and
subsequently relied upon in Hipwell, one can read the statute in a fashion such that there can be
no review of a treating physician's determination of what is required in the way of medical care.
However, the statute makes it clear that the treating physician has to be reasonable in his
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assessment as to what is required. That, of course, makes much more sense. In pretty much all
areas of the law we require people to act in a reasonable fashion, and we allow for a review as to
whether their actions and/or their recommendations were reasonable, especially when it comes to
medical care. Who would want to foster unreasonable medical care?
In the current instance, the Industrial Commission conceded that it could not identify the
treating physician in the sense that they could not identify the individual who ultimately had the
decision making authority to determine if Life Flight Network service was appropriate and to
order the launch of the helicopter itself. The Commission, in a footnote, speculated that it was
either an off duty paramedic or Medic 20. The fact of the matter is, there is no medical record
identifying who has the authority to order Life Flight Network service. We do not even know
whether either one of these individuals, who the Commission presumed to have medical
credentials allowing them to rise to the status of a treating physician, actually made the call. It
could have been "Bertha", a part-time volunteer with no credentials, who actually made the call.
Similarly, we do not know what transpired on the other end. That is to say, we do not
know who received the call from Payette. We know a call was made, because ultimately a
helicopter was launched and managed to find its way to where Claimant was. What we do not
know is who took the call, nor do we know what kind of a review process was in place with Life
Flight Network to review the reasonableness or necessity of response, let alone whether that
process was followed. It seems axiomatic to Defendant that you cannot say the treating physician
reasonably required the launch of a Life Flight Network helicopter when you cannot even
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identify (1) the people who were involved in the process; (2) the people who ultimately decided
to respond; and (3) the criteria they utilized in making the decision.
The Industrial Commission then went on to conclude that Claimant improved or
benefitted in some fashion from the Life Flight Network service by virtue of the fact that when
he showed up at St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center the amputation was completed and he
was left with a healthy stump. There is no nexus demonstrated in the record between the lifeflighting of Claimant to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise and the ultimate
outcome or improvement. The outcome would have been the same had he simply been
transported to Holy Rosary Hospital.
Ultimately, if we try to apply the test outlined by Sprague to the facts of this case, the
claim for compensation to the tune of $21,201.00 must fail, because there literally is no factual
basis to support the Commission's decision.
The fact that there was no basis to support the Commission's decision was obvious to the
Referee who actually heard the case. Neither party nor the Referee at the end of the hearing felt
that briefing would be of any value:
Referee Powers: Okay. Do you gentlemen want to write briefs?
Mr. Owen: I'd be repeating basically the same thing I said here today.
Mr. Bowen: I really don't - would it be of benefit to the Commission?
Referee Powers: Not in this case I don't think. I think it is clear.
Mr. Bowen: I don't see the need for it.
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Referee Powers: I could rule from the bench if I could rule, but I can't so I
won't.

(HT, p. 28, 11. 12-22).
When briefing was ordered by means of Commissioner Baskin's April 7, 2014 letter,
briefing was not requested on the issue posed by the case, that being whether or not Life Flight
Network services constituted reasonable care under Idaho Code § 72-432, but, rather, they
requested briefing as to the following issue:

If the Commission determines the treatment is unreasonable, thus freeing
employer from the obligation of paying, is the Claimant exposed to civil action
for collection of the bill?
(Agency Record, p. 15).
In other words, the decision was not based upon the issue posed by the case, nor was the
decision based upon the facts put before the Commission in order to decide the issue posed by
the case, but, rather, the case was decided based upon the Industrial Commission's concerns that
if they found Life Flight Network services unreasonable, Claimant might face potential exposure
in another forum. That concern has never been the basis for a determination as to what
constitutes reasonable or unreasonable medical care as envisioned by Idaho Code § 72-432(1 ).
That concern is based upon mere speculation as to what might happen in the future if the
Commission finds for the Defendant. Anytime the Industrial Commission finds for a defendant
on a compensability issue, a claimant faces potential exposure for medical treatment rendered.
The provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act are to be liberally construed in favor
of the employee. Holdiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956, 793 P.2d 187, 188
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(1990). However, the Commission is not required to construe facts liberally in favor of the
worker when evidence is conflicting. Aldrich v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 122 Idaho 361, 363, 834
P.2d 878, 880 (1992). Claimant must provide medical testimony by way of physician's testimony
or written medical record, which supports a claim for compensation to a reasonable degree of
medical probability. Langley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781,785,890
P.2d 732, 736 (1995). One of the fundamental rules of procedure is that the party seeking
affirmative relief has the burden of proof. Woodruff v. Butte Mkt, L. C. Co., 64 Idaho 735, 13 7
P.2d 325 (1943).
Claimant's counsel requested that there be a hearing on the issue as to whether the Life
Flight Network services were reasonable under Idaho Code§ 72-432(1). Defendant agreed that it
was appropriate to have the issue heard. The burden of proof was on Claimant, the party seeking
relief. A hearing was held, at which time all the medical records involved in the case were put
before the Industrial Commission in the form of exhibits. Defendant offered, in addition, an
April 9, 2013 letter authored by orthopedic surgeon Paul C. Collins, M.D., who opined:
I do not understand why Life Flight was called or addressed in the first place,
and why the patient was not taken to Holy Rosary. Indeed, it is extremely
reasonable that the patient would be taken physically to Holy Rosary Hospital.
Had there been an incident which may in some way benefitted from a vascular
reconstruction, then the patient could be transferred to St. Alphonsus or St.
Luke's. Indeed, this was in no way necessary.
(Hearing Ex. 6, p. 55).
The facts of the case themselves make it clear that there can be no justification for what
was done. The injury on a relative scale was minor. A perfectly fine hospital with orthopedic
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surgeons was 10 to 15 minutes away. There was no critical time element or emergency per the
opinion of Dr. Collins, or otherwise demonstrated in any of the medical records, which would
justify flying Claimant to Boise. This was apparent to the employer when he arrived on the scene
and he posed the question to the emergency personnel in attendance. He wondered why Claimant
was not being taken to Holy Rosary. Nobody would provide him an answer.
Claimant was flown to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise, where it was
clear that there was not really any possibility of revascularization of the digit, and the amputation
was completed. Claimant was then basically stranded 60 miles from home.
Idaho Code § 72-432(1) is not a difficult statute to understand. It requires the employer to
provide reasonable medical care to an injured worker. Determining what is reasonable is not
rocket science -- it is a standard used in pretty much all areas of the law. Here it is quite clear that
there was absolutely no reason why Claimant was not taken to the local hospital for diagnosis,
triage, imaging, and where further decisions could be made about his medical care, including the
need for transport. We do not know who made the decision. We do not know why the decision
was made, other than a cryptic reference contained in the medical to the effect that the digit
"may" be subject to revascularization. We do not know who made this observation or what their
credentials might be to make such an observation. What we do know is that nothing would have
been lost had they just simply taken Claimant to Holy Rosary, where all these determinations
could be made by individuals who could have actually inspected the finger and utilized vastly
superior credentials and equipment to make the decision. Common sense tells us that the lifeflighting of this gentleman to Boise was not reasonable. There is no substantial competent
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evidence to support the Industrial Commission decision. The decision itself seems to be premised
upon the notion that once a medical decision has been made, the reasonableness of that decision
cannot be reviewed. As previously pointed out, the statute clearly indicates otherwise, and the
record contains no facts to support the decision.
IV.
CONCLUSION

The Industrial Commission's decision does not pass scrutiny by applying the test that was
utilized in Sprague. There is no competent substantial evidence in the record to support such a
finding utilizing Sprague. The Industrial Commission decision does not pass scrutiny by
applying common sense. The Industrial Commission decision is result oriented based upon
concerns beyond the purview of the issue posed by the parties. The Industrial Commission was
concerned about Claimant's potential for exposure in another forum, an issue that it was not
asked to address. Idaho Code § 72-432 requires that the analysis of the compensability of
medical care be based upon what is reasonable at the time care is contemplated. Utilizing that
criteria, it is clear that the life-flighting of Claimant to Boise was not reasonable. Not only was
nothing gained, but to the alternative, sending him to Holy Rosary to more accurately determine
the scope of his injuries and need for care was by far the better option and preserved all potential
remedies, including subsequent life-flighting from Holy Rosary itself to St. Alphonsus. All that
Life Flight Network service accomplished in this instance was a big bill, tying up otherwise
limited resources and stranding Claimant 60 miles from his home.
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In this era of escalating medical costs, it is absolutely critical the public retain some
ability to scrutinize the delivery of medical care. Part of that scrutiny is clearly the ability to
review the reasonableness of the care proposed and the care delivered. If we forego such a
review, rest assured medical costs will explode, and the delivery of medical care will become
increasingly thoughtless and unreasonable. In this instance, the claim is fairly straightforward, as
Referee Powers commented upon at the hearing. There are no facts in the record which explain
how this decision was made, who made the decision, what level of medical expertise they had
such that they had any business making the decision, or why the alternative, that being ground
transport to Holy Rosary, was not a better alternative. To the contrary, the only known physician
who has reviewed the record found no basis upon which he could justify the transportation of
Claimant to Boise, Idaho for treatment. The Industrial Commission decision should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ a y of January, 2015.
BOWEN &BAILEY, LLP

RA(bJp~

R. DANIEL BOWEN--ofeFinn
Attorneys for Defendant J3fuployer/Appellant
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